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Abstract
When new technologies become available, it is not only essential that rms have
the correct investment incentives, but often also that consumers make the proper usage
decisions. This paper studies investment and usage in a shared ATM network. Be-
cause all banks coordinate their ATM investment decisions, there is no strategic but
only a pure cost-saving incentive to invest. At the same time, because retail fees for
cash withdrawals are regulated to zero at both branches and ATMs, consumers may
not have the proper incentives to substitute their transactions from branches to the
available ATMs. We develop an empirical model of coordinated investment and cash
withdrawal demand, where banks choose the number of ATMs and consumers decide
whether to withdraw cash at ATMs or branches. We nd that banks substantially
underinvested in the shared ATM network and thus provided too little geographic
coverage. This contrasts with earlier ndings of strategic overinvestment in networks
with partial incompatibility. Furthermore, we nd that consumer usage of the avail-
able ATM network is too low because of the zero retail fees for cash withdrawals at
branches. A direct promotion of investment (through subsidies or other means) can
improve welfare, but the introduction of retail fees on cash withdrawals at branches
would be more e¤ective, even if this does not encourage investment per se.
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1 Introduction
The incentives to invest in new technologies are not necessarily in line with social welfare.
On the one hand, rms may underinvest because they are not able to appropriate all con-
sumer surplus. On the other hand, they may strategically overinvest because they do not
account for the business stealing e¤ects on their competitors. While the reasons for under-
and overinvestment in new technologies have become reasonably well-understood,1 empirical
evidence remains limited. Furthermore, the focus on investment incentives often provides
an incomplete picture; in many settings it is also essential to understand how consumers
respond and are willing to use the new technology. The joint importance of both investment
and usage of new technologies has been stressed by policy makers, but it has received little
attention in academic research.2
Automated teller machines (ATMs) provide a particularly interesting case to study the
interplay between the rmsinvestment and the consumersusage decisions of a new technol-
ogy. The technology became available in the seventies and provided important opportunities
to the banks to save on the high variable costs from branch transactions by inducing con-
sumers to substitute to lower cost ATM transactions. Since substantial xed investment
costs were required to create su¢ cient geographical coverage, banks quickly joined forces to
build large compatible, or shared, ATM networks. By the mid-nineties many European coun-
tries and U.S. states e¤ectively had a single or a dominant shared ATM network, accessible
to most consumers. However, in several countries this trend reversed with the introduction
of surcharges. The partial incompatibility resulting from these and related retail fees pro-
vided the possibility of strategic overinvestment, as has become well-documented in several
recent studies on ATMs.3 In contrast, very little is known about potential underinvestment
in compatible or shared ATM networks. Furthermore, even less is known on how e¤ective
these investments in infrastructure have been in inducing consumers to substitute and use
the new cost-saving technology.
This paper aims to shed light on the rms investment incentives and the consumers
usage decisions in a shared ATM network. We consider the case of Belgium, where until
1See in particular Arrow (1962), Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and many related contributions regarding
the role of market structure on the incentives to invest in new technologies.
2For example, the most recent OECD (2007) Communications Outlook uses both infrastructure invest-
ment and consumer usage criteria in evaluating the performance of new information and communication
technologies such as broadband. In contrast, the economics literature on technology adoption tends to
treat rm investment and consumer adoption separately, as illustrated by Stonemans (2002) review of the
literature.
3See, for example, Gowrisankaran and Kraner (2007), Hannan and Borzekowki (2007), Ishii (2005) and
several other studies, as reviewed below.
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recently all banks jointly owned a single shared ATM network and coordinated their ATM
investment decisions. At the same time, regulation prevented the banks from charging retail
fees for cash withdrawals at both their own branches and at their shared ATMs. In this
environment, which is representative for many countries at various points in time, ATM
investment was not driven by revenue or strategic incentives. It was instead essentially mo-
tivated by a variable cost-saving incentive, i.e. the prospect that increased ATM availability
would induce consumers to substitute out of high-cost branch transactions towards low-cost
ATM transactions. We ask the following two related questions. First, to which extent was
this environment of coordinated investment responsible for underinvestment in the ATM
network? Second, to which extent did the zero retail fees on cash withdrawals provide the
wrong signal to consumers and did it induce them to use branches too often relative to the
available ATMs? To address these questions, we assess how a direct promotion of invest-
ment (through subsidies or other means) and the introduction of retail fees can contribute
to improving social welfare.
We develop an empirical model of consumer cash withdrawal demand and coordinated
ATM investment in local markets. Consumers demand for branch and ATM cash with-
drawals depends on local ATM availability. The banksATM investment decisions involve a
trade-o¤between variable transaction cost savings and additional xed costs from expanding
the network. The model generates the following insights. First, it measures how increased
ATM availability induces consumers to substitute out of cash withdrawals at branches to
ATMs. Second, it allows us to infer the relative importance of xed costs per ATM and the
variable cost savings from increased ATM usage. To estimate the model we have collected
a unique data set on ATM cash withdrawal demand and the number of ATMs, covering the
entire network across Belgian local markets.
We nd evidence of substantial underinvestment in the provision of ATMs: the total
number of ATMs is only about half of the socially optimal number and the number of
markets without an ATM is three times higher than in the social optimum. These ndings
stem from the fact that the coordinating banks cannot appropriate consumer surplus (in the
form of improved convenience from increased ATM availability) and do not have strategic
motives to invest. However, while the limited ATM investments and especially the perceived
lack of geographic coverage have been highly sensitive political issues, this is only part of the
welfare story. We nd that the welfare losses also stem from the fact that cash withdrawal
fees on both branches and ATMs have been regulated to zero, so that consumers make too
limited use of the existing ATM network. To achieve the maximum welfare gains the direct
promotion of ATM investment (through subsidies or other means) should be combined with
the introduction of cost-based cash withdrawal fees for branch transactions. In fact, we nd
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that a second-best fees-onlypolicy is more e¤ective than an alternative subsidies-only
policy that directly promotes ATM investment while keeping fees regulated to zero. This
is because a fees-only policy also accomplishes desirable cost-saving substitution to ATMs
without requiring large additional xed cost investments in a dense ATM network. At a more
general level, our ndings imply that economic analysis and policy may often be too pre-
occupied with stimulating investment per se, and should be more concerned with providing
the correct price signals to achieve an e¢ cient usage of the cost-reducing investments.
Apart from the general interest question on investment and usage of cost-reducing tech-
nologies, the paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on ATMs. Most of this
literature has been motivated by the recent move to partial incompatibility after the intro-
duction of surcharges in the U.S. In particular, Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2007) and Ishii
(2005) develop structural models of ATM investment, enabling a welfare analysis.4 They
focus on respectively the stand-alone revenue motives and strategic motives from investing
in ATMs, and their results indicate a tendency towards overinvestment in ATMs relative
to the social optimum. They do not take into account the cost-saving incentives for ATM
investment. In contrast, based on a unique data set on cash withdrawals, we focus on this
pure cost-saving incentive: we nd evidence of substantial underinvestment in ATM network
coverage, combined with an insu¢ cient usage of the existing investments due to incorrect
price signals. While several studies have measured the variable cost savings from ATM cash
withdrawals based on aggregate cost information, no work has attempted to integrate this
in a model to study the investment incentives and consumer usage responses.5
From a methodological perspective our empirical model of ATM investment closely re-
lates to the empirical entry literature. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992)
introduced models of free entry. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) added a demand side to the
free entry model enabling them to draw inferences on xed costs. Ishii (2005) models ATM
investment and deposit demand sequentially, using Pakes et al.s (2006) moment inequalities
method for the investment part of the model. In contrast with Berry and Waldfogel (1999)
and Ishii (2005) we consider coordinated investment. Furthermore, we allow ATM demand
and investment to be simultaneously determined, i.e. we account for the fact that they may
depend on common unobserved local market characteristics. Intuitively, banks tend to invest
4Other empirical contributions on the e¤ects of greater incompatibility on ATM investment include Knittel
and Stango (2004, 2006) and Hannan and Borzekowski (2007). Theoretical contributions on ATM deployment
and e¢ ciency include Matutes and Padilla (1994), Bernhardt and Massoud (2005) and Donze and Dubec
(2006).
5Studies measuring cost savings from ATM withdrawals link bank accounting cost data with the number
of ATMs and the number of bank branches, see e.g. Felgran (1984), Berger (1985), Humphrey (1994), or
Humphrey et al. (2003).
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especially in markets where they expect a high ATM demand. We therefore account for both
selection and endogeneity issues in measuring the causal impact of ATM investment on ATM
demand.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant industry background in
an international context and takes a rst look at our data set. Section 3 presents the model
of coordinated investment, and compares it with socially optimal investment. Sections 4, 5
and 6 respectively discuss the econometric specication, the empirical results, and the policy
counterfactuals. Section 7 presents a robustness analysis from two extensions of the model,
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Industry background and data set
We study ATM investment and cash withdrawal demand (usage) based on the shared net-
work in Belgium in 1994. Before developing the econometric model, we discuss the relevant
industry background in an international context and have a rst look at our data set.
2.1 Industry background
The evolution to a shared ATM network Banks traditionally used their own branch
networks to provide cash withdrawal services to its customers. In the late sixties and early
seventies the rst ATMs emerged, providing the banks with opportunities to reduce labour
costs at their branches. In both the U.S. and Europe, the banks initially developed pri-
vate ATM networks, accessible to their own customers only. However, to cut costs banks
quickly started to cooperate, resulting in the development of shared networks, accessible
to all customers of the participating banks. In the U.S., the interconnection of smaller re-
gional networks was followed by a process of consolidation of many shared networks and the
introduction of national networks.7 In Europe, there was a similar trend towards shared
ATM networks. This resulted in single or dominant shared networks in large countries such
as France and Italy, as well as in several smaller countries such as Belgium, Finland, the
Netherlands, Sweden or Switzerland; see B.I.S. (1999, 2003) and Snellman (2006). However,
6Because our model treats investment and demand simultaneously, we can make equilibrium investment
and demand predictions under alternative policies. In contrast, Ishiis conclusions about overinvestment in
incompatible networks are not based on equilibrium predictions because of the complexities with multiple
equilibria in her framework. She therefore only looks at the direction of each banks investment decisions.
7See McAndrews (1991) for a discussion of the evolution to shared ATM networks in the early years in
the U.S.; and Ishii (2005) for a review of the recent U.S. evolution and the introduction of surcharges.
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parallel to these shared ATM networks, banks continued to provide cash withdrawal services
to their own depositors through their traditional branch networks.
Against this background we analyze the shared ATM network in Belgium in 1994. In
the late seventies cooperation between the large banks resulted in the emergence of two
competing ATM networks. Consumers could withdraw cash from any ATM of their own
network, but had no access to the competing network. Because of cost considerations and
public pressure to increase user convenience the two networks were made compatible in 1987,
enabling all Belgian debit card holders to withdraw cash from ATMs of either network. A
few years later, in 1990, the two networks merged completely to create a common network
operator, Banksys, co-owned by all the banks. Banksys managed the shared ATM network
and the emerging electronic services with debit cards.8
During 1990-2005, an ATM-committee within Banksys made the decisions to invest in
additional ATMs, and replace or remove existing ones. This ATM-committee consisted of
representatives of the larger banks, a representative of the smaller banks and a representative
of the network operator. The committee decided on the number and location of ATMs for
each local market. The ATMs were always installed at one of the banksbranches, hence
never o¤-premise(e.g. in shopping malls). The banks had to bear the costs of the ATMs
that were located at their branches, including the xed investment and maintenance costs
and the variable costs of cash withdrawals (e.g. relling ATMs). There were a number of
mechanisms to ensure cooperation among all banks. First, there was a mutual understanding
that banks should host ATMs in proportion to their market shares. In practice, most banks
indeed had a market share in the ATM network close to their market share in terms of
branches or deposits.9 Second, banks received compensation for the ATM services through
cost-based interchange fees.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the total number of ATMs in Belgium since 1979. The
shared ATM network has grown nearly linearly during the eighties to reach maturity in the
early nineties. Our data set covers a cross-section of local markets in 1994. This year is well-
suited for studying ATM investment and demand. First, Figure 1 shows that 1994 represents
a mature long-term situation, making it reasonable to abstract from dynamic considerations.
Second, in 1994 consumers still made only limited use of electronic payment services and of
8As in some other countries, there was one other very small network, Postomat, accessible only to the
customers of the Belgian Postal Bank. This network joined forces with Banksys in 2000.
9In 1994, the seven large banks were ASLK, Generale Bank, Gemeentekrediet, BBL, Kredietbank, Cera,
and BACOB. They had a nation-wide presence and their market shares in terms of branches (deposits) of
respectively 15 (12), 14 (13), 12 (15), 12 (10), 10 (10), 12 (5) and 8 (5) percent. Their market shares in the
ATM network were respectively 21, 21, 16, 13, 9, 5 and 7 percent.
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incompatible private ATMs, installed within the banksown branches.10
Retail fees and costs of cash withdrawals Banks have a long tradition of low or zero
variable retail fees for providing payment services to their own customers, including cash
withdrawal services at own branches or shared ATMs. Cash withdrawal services to customers
of other banks are typically not available at branches, but they are available at the banks
shared ATMs, possibly at a retail fee in the form of a surcharge. McAndrews (2003) provides
an overview of the various retail fees for ATM cash withdrawal services to the banksown
customers (on-us fees and on-others fees) and to non-customers (surcharges).11
Government regulation in Belgium has for a long time completely prevented the banks
from charging retail fees for any payment related services, including cash withdrawals at
branches or ATMs. Decreasing margins following intensied competition, a drop in the
interbanking rates, and public demand for more transparency increased the banksneeds for
charging retail fees. Intensive lobbying eventually resulted in stepwise liberalizations in 1991
and 1993, enabling the banks to charge variable retail fees for cash withdrawal services. In
practice, however, a universal service obligation kept the variable fees equal to zero until the
late nineties.12 In sum, Belgian banks have generally charged zero variable retail fees, both
for branch cash withdrawal services to their own customers and for the shared ATM cash
withdrawals services to all debit card holders. This situation is similar to that in many other
European countries, as surveyed in a study by Retail Banking Ltd. (2005) for the European
Commission.
The absence of retail fees does clearly not reect the bankscosts. While precise estimates
are di¢ cult to nd, it is well-known that the variable costs for cash withdrawal services are
considerably higher at branches than at ATMs. Berger (1985) and Humphrey (1994) nd
that the variable costs are about twice as high at branches than at ATMs. According to
Kimball and Gregor (1995), the per transaction cost is $0.27 at ATMs, compared to $1.07
at branches, while Fasig (2001) states that transaction costs vary between $0.15 to $0.50
at ATMs and $1 to $2 at branches. The variable cost savings at ATMs should however
10The incompatible private ATMs were exclusively for the banks own customers, allowing for cash with-
drawals and other traditional branch transactions, such as the ordering of documents and the transfering of
funds. In 1994, less than one fth of the branches were equipped with an incompatible private ATM, and we
will simply treat them as an integrated part of the banksbranch networks.
11In addition to the retail fees, there are also wholesale fees, i.e. the interchange fees that banks charge to
each other, and switch fees charged by the network operator to the banks.
12The universal service obligation forced banks to o¤er a minimum amount of payment services, including
cash withdrawals at branches or ATMs at a low cost. In practice, banks only charge a small annual xed fee
for payment services and no variable retail fees.
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be balanced against the xed costs of investing and maintaining ATMs. According to the
Belgian network operator Banksys, the xed cost per ATM amounts to about e2,300 per
month. This is similar to estimates quoted by Ishii (2005) for the U.S.13 We will come back
to these cost estimates in our empirical analysis, where we will infer the ratio of xed ATM
costs over variable cost savings from our econometric model of ATM investment.
Summary Belgian banks have for a long time coordinated their investment decisions in
the shared ATM network. The year 1994 is well-suited for an empirical analysis of ATM
investment and demand since the network had matured and competing electronic payment
services were still of limited importance. Banks charged no retail fees for cash withdrawal
services, whether at incompatible branches or at shared ATMs. However, banks could re-
alize potentially important variable cost savings from cash withdrawals at ATMs instead
of branches, to be traded o¤ against the xed costs from setting-up and maintaining the
shared ATM network. These observations will motivate our empirical model of coordinated
investment, developed and estimated in the next sections.
2.2 A rst look at the data
2.2.1 The data set
Our main data set consists of ATM cash withdrawal demand and the number of ATMs for a
cross-section of local markets in Belgium in 1994. The markets are dened by postal codes,
which are part of administrative municipalities and typically consist of about one or two
traditional towns. To reduce potential problems with overlapping markets, we focus on a
subsample of 659 non-urban markets (dened as markets with a population density of less
than 800 per km2), having on average about 8,700 inhabitants. But we also considered a
robustness analysis based on the full sample of all 842 markets including the cities. For each
market, we observe the total number of ATM cash withdrawals and their nominal monetary
value, both expressed as 1994 monthly averages. In addition, we observe the number of shared
ATMs, dened as the number of distinct ATM locations per market. We also collected data
on the banksbranch locations in 1994, and on various demographic characteristics such as
population size.14
13Ishii (2005) quotes 2003 American BankersAssociation numbers, according to which the cost of buying
an ATMmachine is $50,000, and annual maintenance cost is between $12,000 and $15,000. Using her ve-year
linear depreciation period this amounts to a monthly xed cost of between $1,833 and $2,083.
14The data set on the ATMs was provided to us by the ATM network operator Banksys. The data
on the branch locations is from B.V.B., the Belgian Banking Federation. The demographic characteristics
were obtained from the N.I.S. (National Institute of Statistics), Ecodata (Federal Government Agency for
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Table 1 provides precise denitions of our variables, and Table 2 presents summary sta-
tistics for the cross-section of 659 non-urban markets, and the subsample of 310 markets
with at least one ATM. The per capita number of ATM cash withdrawals QA is on average
0.56 per month for all markets, and 0.78 for the markets with at least one ATM.15 The
average value per cash withdrawal VA=QA is e101 (average across the markets with at least
one ATM). The availability of ATMs across the local markets is rather limited. There are no
ATMs in 349 out of 659 markets, and in those markets with at least one ATM the average
number of ATMs N is only 1.57.
Consumers can also withdraw cash from their own bank branches rather than from the
shared ATMs. We do not have rich data on branch cash withdrawals at the local market
level, but at the national level we estimate that consumers make about 2.07 cash withdrawals
per month.16 Hence, ATM usage is relatively limited: only about one third of the cash with-
drawals take place at the shared ATMs and the remaining two-thirds are at the branches.
Branch availability to consumers in need for cash can be measured since we observe the num-
ber of branches per market for each bank. Since branches of rival banks are not compatible,
a crude aggregate measure of branch availability is the average number of branches per bank
in each market. Table 2 shows that there are on average 0.86 branches per bank across all
markets, and on average 1.25 branches per bank in the sample of markets with at least one
shared ATM. Consumers thus tend to nd about the same amount of branches of their own
bank as shared ATMs within a local market.
The remaining variables are the market demographics. In our empirical analysis these may
a¤ect both ATM cash withdrawal demand and the protability of investing in ATMs. The
demographics include population (number of inhabitants per market), the market surface (in
km2), the number of enterprises, the fraction of foreigners, the fraction of young (under the
age of 18) and elderly (over the age of 65), the unemployment rate, and a dummy variable
for the region of Flanders (Dutch-speaking part of Belgium). Table 2 shows that several
of the demographics may di¤er depending on whether the full sample or the subsample of
markets with at least one ATM is considered. In particular, the average population size is
8,738 across all markets, but up to 13,445 in markets where banks invested in at least one
ATM.
Economics), and the R.S.Z. (the National Institute of Social Security).
15These averages become slightly larger when city markets are included, i.e. 0.80 for all markets, and 0.98
for the markets with at least one ATM.
16The estimate of 2.07 cash withdrawals per month is based on recent 2004 information at the national
level on cash withdrawals. Note that the government also used an estimate of 2 cash withdrawals per month
in its universal service obligation proposal for the banks.
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Preliminary relationships Table 3 shows the relationship between our main variables
of interest, i.e. the per capita number of ATM cash withdrawals QA and the number of
shared ATMs, N . The average of QA is 0.63 across markets with only one ATM and this
gradually increases as N increases, to reach an average of 1.13 in markets with 5 available
ATMs. Table 3 also shows that the average value per cash withdrawal VA=QA decreases in
N , but only weakly from e102 in markets with one ATM to e98 in markets with 5 ATMs.
To gain further insights in the relationship between ATM demand or usage and ATM
availability, we estimate two simple OLS regressions, based on the sample of markets with
at least one ATM. The rst regression takes lnQA as the dependent variable and relates this
to lnN and the log of the number of branches per bank, after controlling for the market
demographics. In the second regression lnVA=QA is the dependent variable, and includes the
same explanatory variables. The regressions should be interpreted with care, as lnN may
be correlated with the error term because of both sample selection and endogeneity issues:
banks tend to invest in no or few ATMs in markets where they expect a low ATM demand,
and vice versa.
Table 4 shows the results. We focus mainly on the regression for lnQA in the rst part of
the table. The elasticity of ATM cash withdrawal demand QA with respect to the number
of ATMs N is 0.63, which is positive and highly signicant. This may describe a causal
e¤ect of ATM availability on demand or usage, or simply reect the fact that banks invest
in many ATMs when they expect high demand. Furthermore, the elasticity of ATM cash
withdrawal demand with respect to the number of branches per bank is -0.51. In absolute
value this is not signicantly di¤erent from the coe¢ cient on the number of ATMs (p-value
of 0.10). Hence, ATM usage increases by about the same amount when ATM availability
increases as when per bank branch availability decreases. This indicates that consumers use
ATMs as a substitute for branches to withdraw cash.
The second part of Table 4 shows the regression for lnVA=QA. The elasticity of the av-
erage value per cash withdrawal VA=QA with respect to the number of ATMs N is negative
and signicant, but its magnitude is quite small (-0.03). Hence, while QA increases substan-
tially with ATM availability, VA=QA decreases only to a small extent. This suggests that the
positive relationship between ATM withdrawals and availability is not due to the fact that
consumers withdraw a lower value per transaction, but rather because they substitute out
of cash withdrawals at branches.
We emphasize again that the regressions on ATM availability should be interpreted with
care, because N is an endogenous variable implying both selection and endogeneity issues
with simple OLS estimation. The next sections develop and estimate a model of ATM demand
and coordinated investment in ATMs that take these issues into account. This will enable
9
us to obtain more reliable conclusions on the causal e¤ect of ATM availability on demand,




When banks can charge retail fees for cash withdrawal services, they have at least two
broad prot motives for adopting ATMs. First, there is the pure stand-alone prot motive
associated with the fee revenues from ATM cash withdrawals. Second, there is a strategic
motive when the fees come in the form of on-others fees and/or surcharges, i.e. additional
fees for consumers using ATMs from banks other than their own. These fees result in partial
incompatibility between di¤erent ATM networks, providing banks with larger networks a
strategic advantage over their rivals, as they can more easily attract new customers, or
raise their rivalscosts. The recent ATM literature has largely focused on these two prot
incentives for adopting ATMs, see e.g. McAndrews (2003) for an overview of the theoretical
literature and Hannan et al. (2003), Knittel and Stango (2004), Ishii (2005), Gowrisankaran
and Krainer (2007), and Hannan and Borzekowski (2007) for recent empirical contributions.
There is, however, also a third prot incentive for adopting ATMs, the pure cost-saving
incentive, which is present even if banks cannot charge retail fees. An ATM network with
a broad geographic coverage induces customers to switch from branch to ATM cash with-
drawals. This implies potentially important variable cost savings, but these need to be bal-
anced against the xed costs of setting up the ATM network. The cost-saving incentive is
therefore larger if rms coordinate their ATM investment decisions and set up a shared ATM
network.
The cost-saving incentive was already highlighted in the early literature as an important
motive for ATM investment, but data limitations prevented a proper identication. Our
analysis models and identies precisely this cost-saving incentive in an environment where
the two other prot incentives are absent because of zero retail fees, as in many countries.
Consistent with our industry background we rst develop a model of coordinated ATM
investment and demand in the absence of retail fees for cash withdrawals. This model will
form the basis of our econometric analysis. We then consider the socially optimal outcome,
and show how a social planner can intervene by regulating fees (at branches and ATMs),
and/or providing subsidies per installed ATM. This will be used to perform a counterfactual
policy analysis.
10
Our empirical model builds on earlier models of free entry, originating from Bresnahan
and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992). Berry and Waldfogel (1999) added a demand side
to a free entry model, which enabled them to separately identify the demand and xed cost
parameters. Recent related work that incorporates both an entry and a demand equation
can be found in e.g. Abraham et al. (2005), Ishii (2005), and Smith (2007). Our own model
also consists of an entry and demand equation, but the entry equation comes from a model
of coordinated entry rather than one of free entry.
3.2 Coordinated investment
For a cross-section of local markets we observe the monthly number of ATM cash withdrawals
per capita QA and the number of shared ATMs N . For each market our model of coordinated
ATM investment species how QA and N (or usage and investment) are simultaneously
determined and depend on observed and unobserved market characteristics.
A market consists of L consumers. Each consumer may withdraw cash at the branch of
its bank or at a shared ATM, and the demands depend on the availability of ATMs. Let
ATM cash withdrawal demand, QA = QA(N), be increasing in the number of ATMs N : as
N increases, the average distance to an ATM in the local market decreases so that demand
for cash withdrawals at ATMs increases. Similarly, let cash withdrawal demand at branches,
QB(N), be decreasing in N : as the availability of ATMs increases, it becomes relatively
less attractive to withdraw cash at branches and consumers substitute to ATMs. Total cash
withdrawal demand is Q(N) = QA(N) + QB(N). Let Q(N) be nondecreasing in N , i.e. an
increase in the availability of ATMs leads to an increase in the total number of withdrawals,
unless total cash withdrawal demand is inelastic with respect to N . In sum, increasing the
number of ATMs leads to substitution from branch to ATM cash withdrawals, and to an
overall expansion of cash withdrawals unless total cash demand is inelastic.
Banks coordinate their ATM investment (or entry) decisions, in line with our industry
background discussed in Section 2. In each market, they choose the number of shared ATMs
N to maximize their joint prots (N). The joint prots consist of a stand-alone component
0, independent of N , and of several other components that depend on N . There is a
constant variable cost per ATM cash withdrawal of cA, and a constant variable cost per
branch cash withdrawal of cB > cA. The xed cost of an ATM is F , which consists of both
investment and maintenance costs. Banks do not charge retail fees for cash withdrawal at
either ATMs or branches. They also do not obtain subsidies per ATM. The banks joint
prots in a given market are then given by:
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(N) = 0   cAQA(N)L  cBQB(N)L  FN: (1)
This is simply the stand-alone prot component 0, minus the total variable costs from
ATM and branch cash withdrawals, minus the xed costs of all shared ATMs in the market.
Note that the joint prots do not depend on the interchange fees, which banks pay to each
other through the network operator. These interchange fees are simply transfers between
banks and cancel out when adding up the banksindividual prots to obtain joint prots. If
rms would choose ATMs in an uncoordinated way to maximize their individual prots, then
the interchange fees become potentially relevant and may serve as a mechanism to soften
competition for depositors; see Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Donze and Dubec (2006) for
analyses of the strategic use of interchange fees when banks do not coordinate their ATM
investment decisions.
The banksmarginal joint prots from investing in N ATMs are:
(N)  (N   1) =  cA (QA(N) QA(N   1))L  cB (QB(N) QB(N   1))L  F:
To interpret this economically, substitute out QB(N) using Q(N) = QA(N) + QB(N). The
marginal joint prots can then be rewritten as:
(N) (N 1) = (cB   cA) (QA(N) QA(N   1))L| {z }
variable cost saving
due to substitution
  cB (Q(N) Q(N   1))L| {z }
variable cost increase
due to market expansion
 F: (2)
This says that the change in banksjoint prots from one additional ATM consists of three
components. First, an additional ATM induces consumers to substitute from high variable
cost cash withdrawals at branches to low variable cost cash withdrawals at ATMs. Second,
an additional ATM may increase the total number of cash withdrawals, which generates
additional variable costs. Third, there is a xed cost involved in installing an additional
ATM. If total cash withdrawal demand Q(N) is inelastic, the second term cancels so that an
increase in the number of ATMs reduces to a simple trade-o¤ between variable cost savings
and an additional xed cost.
The banks choose the number of shared ATMs N to maximize their joint prots. The
optimal number of ATMs is N = 0 if:
(1)  (0) < 0 (3)
and N = n > 0 if:
(n+ 1)  (n) < 0  (n)  (n  1); (4)
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i.e. the marginal joint prots from investing in n ATMs should be positive, and the marginal
joint prots from investing in n+1 ATMs should be negative. These are necessary conditions
for joint prot maximization. They are also su¢ cient if the joint prots (N) are concave in
N , or equivalently if the marginal joint prots are decreasing inN . Note how the requirement
of decreasing marginal joint prots in our model of coordinated entry parallels the common
requirement of decreasing individual prots in traditional empirical models of free entry (as
in e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990).
3.3 Socially optimal investment
The above model describes ATM investment when banks coordinate and cannot charge retail
fees on either ATM or branch cash withdrawals. This describes the status quo situationand
forms the basis for our empirical analysis. In our policy counterfactuals presented in Section
6, we will compare the status quo with the social optimum, and assess how a regulator can
set subsidies and/or retail fees to induce banks to implement the social optimum. Subsidies
should be viewed as an instrument to directly promote ATM investment, but other means
such as tax deductions may obviously also be possible. Retail fees mainly serve to inuence
ATM demand or usage, i.e. they may induce consumers to use ATMs given the available
ATM network.
Suppose that the banks can charge a retail fee tA per ATM cash withdrawal and a
retail fee tB per branch cash withdrawal.17 Consumer surplus CS(N; tA; tB) is increasing
in N and decreasing in both fees tA and tB. The per capita demand for cash withdrawals
at ATMs is QA(N; tA; tB). This is increasing in N (as in the status quo situation where
tA = tB = 0), decreasing in the own retail ATM fee tA and increasing in the branch retail
fee tB. Similarly, per capita demand for cash withdrawals at branches is QB(N; tA; tB),
decreasing in N , increasing in tA and decreasing in tB. The earlier status quo demands
with zero fees are dened as QA(N)  QA(N; 0; 0) and QB(N)  QB(N; 0; 0). In section 4
we provide a utility-consistent specication that relates CS(N; tA; tB) to QA(N; tA; tB) and
QB(N; tA; tB).
Producer surplus is equal to the banksjoint prots. These now also include retail fee
revenues and a subsidy S per ATM:
(N; tA; tB; S) = 0+(tA   cA)QA(N; tA; tB)L+(tB   cB)QB(N; tA; tB)L+(S F )N; (5)
17The ATM retail fee tA applies to all consumers regardless their bank a¢ liation. This rules out surcharges
and on-others fees, so that ATMs remain fully compatible. The branch retail fee tB only applies to the
banksown customers since branches are incompatible.
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assumed to be concave in N . This extends the status quo prot function (1) to include the
fees and subsidies, so (N)  (N; 0; 0; 0).
Total welfare in the presence of retail fees and subsidies, W (N; tA; tB), is then the sum
of producer surplus (5), consumer surplus and government revenues  SN , i.e.
W (N; tA; tB) = (N; tA; tB; S) + CS(N; tA; tB)  SN: (6)
Note that total welfare is independent of the subsidy S, since SN is also part of(N; tA; tB; S),
and cancels out as it is just a transfer from the social planner to the banks. The social op-
timum or rst-best solution then maximizes W (N; tA; tB) with respect to N , tA and tB.
The status quo situation may not be socially optimal for two reasons. First, banks choose
the number of ATMsN to maximize their own joint prots, and they do not take into account
the e¤ects on consumer surplus. Since consumer surplus CS(N; tA; tB) is increasing in N
and (N; tA; tB; S) is concave in N , the banks will underinvest in N if the subsidy S is equal
to zero.18 Second, the retail cash withdrawal fees tA and tB are below variable costs and in
fact regulated to zero. This implies that the demand for ATM withdrawals and especially
for the high variable cost branch withdrawals may be distorted.
The social planner can induce the banks to implement the social optimum in a decen-
tralized way, by rst setting S (instead of N), tA and tB, and subsequently letting banks
coordinate on N , given S, tA and tB. Formally, use (5) to compute the banksmarginal joint
prots with fees and subsidies, and obtain inequality conditions analogous to (4). These de-
ne the banksjoint prot maximizing number of ATMs n(tA; tB; S), given the fees tA and tB
and the subsidy S. The social planner then maximizes total welfare W (n( tA; tB; S); tA; tB)
with respect to the fees tA and tB and the subsidy S. Note that while the subsidy has no
direct e¤ect on welfare (as SN is a transfer that cancels out), it has an indirect impact by
inuencing the bankscoordinated investment n( tA; tB; S).
In our counterfactual policy analysis we will compare the status quo situation with the
social optimum or rst-best, as implemented through optimal fees tA and tB and a subsidy
S. We will also consider two second-best solutions. In the fees-onlycase, the social planner
keeps the subsidy at S = 0, and chooses tA and tB to maximize W (n( tA; tB; 0); tA; tB). In
the subsidies-onlycase, the social planner keeps the fees at tA = tB = 0, and chooses S to
maximizeW (n( 0; 0; S); 0; 0). We will assess to which extent the fees-only and subsidies-only
cases improve over the status quo situation and come close to the rst-best.
18To see this, set S = 0 and suppress the retail fees as arguments. When N is continuous, the coordinated
optimum NC solves 0(NC) = 0 and the social optimum NS solves 0(NS)+CS0(NS) = 0. The second term
is positive by assumption, so that the rst term is negative. Hence, 0(NS) < 0(NC), so that NS > NC
by concavity of (N). This argument still holds if S is positive and su¢ ciently close to zero.
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4 Econometric specication
We now apply the model of coordinated investment and present the econometric specication.
For a cross-section of markets we observe per capita ATM cash withdrawal demand QA and
the number of ATMs N . They are simultaneously determined and depend on observed and
unobserved market characteristics. We develop a specication that will enable estimation
by standard joint maximum likelihood.
4.1 ATM demand or usage
Section 3 allowed total demand for cash withdrawals Q(N) to be increasing in N . We now
assume that additional ATMs mainly involve substitution from branches to ATMs without
raising the total number of cash withdrawals. So total demand is inelastic and equal to a
constant Q(N) = Q. This is not unreasonable here, since our reduced form evidence, pre-
sented in Section 2, suggested that consumers do not withdraw lower values per withdrawal
as ATM availability increases. We can then write the ATM and branch demands as shares in
total cash withdrawal demand, i.e. QA(N) = sA(N)Q and QB(N) = (1  sA(N))Q, where
sA(N) 2 [0; 1] is the ATM cash withdrawal share. We will now specify this share, based on
a model of consumers a¢ liated to the di¤erent banks.
Each consumer is a¢ liated to a bank i, and decides to make Q cash withdrawals at either
one of the N shared ATMs in the market, or at one of the Bi branches of bank i to which she
is a¢ liated. She incurs a total price pA for an ATM cash withdrawal and piB for a branch cash
withdrawal. Let pA = pA(N) be decreasing in N , capturing the fact that the consumers
expected travel cost decreases as the number of ATMs increases. More specically, the
expected travel cost is equal to the travel cost per unit of distance k, times the expected
distance to the nearest ATM. Assuming a spatial Poisson process for the consumersand




M=N , where M is the surface of the
market where the consumers and ATMs are located.19 The total price pA for an ATM cash
withdrawal is the sum of the expected travel cost and the retail cash withdrawal fee tA (zero




M=N + tA. Similarly, the price for a branch






Indirect utility or consumer surplus of a depositor a¢ liated to bank i takes the following
19The expected distance between a consumer and the nearest ATM is thus inversely proportional to the
square root of the number of ATM locations, which is known as the square root law. See for example Kolesar
and Blum (1973) for a derivation.
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logit form:










where vA and vB are the intrinsic utilities for withdrawing cash at ATMs and branches,
respectively. This specication can be derived from either a logit discrete choice or a repre-
sentative consumer model; see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992). We will consider an
alternative semi-log specication for consumer surplus in Section 7.
Applying Roys identity to (7), bank i s consumers have the following share of ATM
cash withdrawals in their total cash withdrawals:
siA (pA) =
1
1 + exp (vB   vA    (piB   pA))
: (8)





wisiA (pA(N)) ; (9)
where wi is the market share of bank i. We assume that the banksmarket shares wi are
independent of the number of ATMs, since the ATMs are shared and unlike incompatible
ATMs do not provide a strategic advantage (Matutes and Padilla (1994)).20
The aggregate ATM cash withdrawal share sA(N) is the deterministic part of demand.
Total per capita demand for cash withdrawals Q is the random part and is specied as:
lnQ = X + 1; (10)
where X is a vector of observed market characteristics inuencing Q and 1 is an unobserved
error term a¤ecting total demand in the market.
UsingQA = sA(N)Q and (10), we obtain the following equation for ATM cash withdrawal
demand:
lnQA = ln sA(N) +X + 1; (11)
where sA(N) is given by (8) and (9). This is the ATM demand equation to be taken to
the data, for tA = tB = 0. Intuitively, the market characteristics X inuence ATM demand
through the parameter vector . The number of ATMs and branches, entering pA and pB,
inuence ATM demand through the parameter . The remaining parameter to be estimated
is vB   vA, the intrinsic utility di¤erence from withdrawing cash at a branch rather than an
ATM. While vB vA can be made a function of market characteristics, it is not well identied
20We do not directly observe the market shares wi at the local market level. As a proxy we take the market
share according to the number of branches and suitably rescale so that the national market shares according
to our proxy equal the observed national market shares.
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from  since total cash withdrawal demand Q is unobserved. We therefore estimate vB   vA
as a constant, and assess identication by comparing total cash demand Q as predicted by
our model with our estimate from an external source (Q = 2:07 withdrawals per month, as
discussed in Section 2.2). Furthermore, in Section 7 we will consider an alternative functional
form for sA(N) to show the robustness of our results.
4.2 ATM investment
Banks coordinate their ATM investment (or entry) decisions to maximize their joint prots.
With inelastic demand of total cash withdrawals, i.e. Q(N) = Q, and QA(N) = sA(N)Q,
the marginal joint prots (2) from investing in an additional ATM simplify to:
(N)  (N   1) = (cB   cA) (sA(N)  sA(N   1))QL  F: (12)
Intuitively, investing in one more ATM involves a simple trade-o¤ between an additional
xed cost F against the variable cost savings from consumers substituting from branch to
ATM cash withdrawals, as reected in the higher ATM cash withdrawal share.
Substituting the marginal joint prots (12) in the necessary inequality conditions for





and N = n > 0 if:
(sA(n+ 1)  sA(n))QL <
F
cB   cA
< (sA(n)  sA(n  1))QL: (14)
These inequality conditions for joint prot maximization are also su¢ cient if sA(N) is concave
in N . In the empirical analysis we will verify whether this is indeed the case at our obtained
parameter estimates.
The investment model does not separately identify the xed costs from the variable cost




= W + 2; (15)
where W is a vector of observed market characteristics and 2 is an unobserved error term.
In Section 7 we will extend this specication and allow F to depend on N , thereby allowing
for economies of density.
21Ishii (2005) and Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2007) identify xed costs by making assumptions on the
variable costs of cash withdrawals. We do not make these assumptions at the estimation stage. In our policy
counterfactuals, we also make identifying assumptions, but rather on xed costs for which we have better
information than on variable costs.
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Substituting (15) in the inequality conditions (13) and (14), the number of ATMs is
N = 0 if
ln (sA(1)  sA(0)) +X + 1 + lnL < W + 2 (16)
and N = n > 0 if
ln (sA(n+ 1)  sA(n))+X+1+lnL < W+2 < ln (sA(n)  sA(n  1))+X+1+lnL:
(17)
These investment conditions are similar to the inequalities in an ordered probit model. They
can be taken to the data, together with the demand equation (11). Note that the demand
error term 1 also enters the investment conditions (16)(17). Intuitively, a high demand
shock does not only imply a high ATM demand QA, but also high marginal joint prots,
inducing banks to invest in many shared ATMs N . This emphasizes the importance of
properly accounting for the fact that QA and N are simultaneously determined and may
depend on the same unobserved factors. We turn to estimation next.
4.3 Estimation
For our cross-section of markets we observe the number of shared ATMs N and ATM cash
withdrawal demand QA unless N = 0. Dening
"1  1 (18)
"2  2   1
Z  X + lnL W
n  ln (sA(n)  sA(n  1)) ;
we can write the demand equation (11) and the investment inequalities (16)(17) more
compactly as follows:
For N = 0: QA unobserved
Z +  1 < "2
For N = n > 0: lnQA = ln sA(n) +X + "1
Z + n+1 < "2 < Z + n:
(19)
The model thus essentially consists of a demand or usage equation, and investment inequal-
ities as in an ordered probit model.
If one is not interested in the parameters determining ATM investment, one may in prin-
ciple estimate the demand equation separately to learn about the causal impact of ATM
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availability on ATM cash withdrawal demand. However, OLS estimation would be unwar-
ranted because of the endogeneity and selection problems stemming from the simultaneous
determination of QA and N . Intuitively, QA and N tend to be strongly correlated even in
the absence of a causal relationship, because banks tend to invest in many ATMs under high
demand shocks and in few ATMs under low demand shocks. For very low demand shocks,
banks decide to invest in no ATMs, the traditional selection problem. Econometrically, the
error terms "1 and "2 will be correlated since the demand error term 1 enters both error
terms through "1  1 and "2  2 1. This correlation arises here for economic reasons, i.e.
the fact that the unobserved demand term 1 inuences the banksinvestment decisions.
22
One solution to deal with the simultaneity of QA and N is to include a correction term
in the demand equation in the spirit of Heckmans (1978) and Amemiyas (1984) binary re-
sponse selection models. Several recent papers extend these models to a non-binary response
framework; see e.g. Mazzeo (2002), Manuszak and Moul (2006), Watson (2007), or Cohen
and Mazzeo (2007). Our econometric specication enables a more e¢ cient approach, i.e.
estimate the demand and investment model jointly using maximum likelihood. Since we are
interested in both the demand and cost side parameters, we follow this approach here.23
Let f12(), f1() and f2() be the joint and marginal density functions of "1 and "2. We
can then write the likelihood contributions for our sample of markets. For markets with
N = 0 we have




and for markets with N = n > 0, we have




where "1 = lnQA   ln sA(n) X from (19).
Assume that "1 and "2 have a bivariate normal distribution, with means of zero, variances
of 21 and 
2
2 and a covariance of 12. Following standard practice in simpler Tobit II models
22The econometric model can be compared with Gronaus (1974) model of wage determination: wages are
only observed for individuals who decide to participate in the labour market, and this participation decision
may depend on the same unobserved factors (skills) as the wages. The di¤erence with our framework is
that the participation decision in Gronaus model is a binary decision that matters for selection but does not
directly inuence wages. In contrast, the investment (or entry) decision is an ordered variable that matters
for selection and in addition directly inuences demand.
23To estimate the investment model, one could alternatively consider Pakes et al.s (2006) moment inequal-
ity approach, which achieves partial identication in a more general setting (e.g. allowing for multi-agent
strategic interactions and more general functional forms). One advantage of maximum likelihood in our ap-
plication is that it enables simultaneous estimation of the demand and investment model, thereby accounting
for common unobservables a¤ecting both demand and investment.
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with normal errors, this enables us to write the second likelihood contribution as a product
of (conditional) univariate normals. Denoting the standard normal distribution and density
functions by () and (), respectively, we can thus rewrite the likelihood contributions as
P (N = 0) = 1  
























In many latent variable models the standard deviation 2 is not identied. In our application,
however, 2 is identied since one parameter of the variables in Z is restricted, i.e. the
parameter for lnL (the log of the number of consumers) entering Z is equal to one; see
(18). This restriction is based on the reasonable assumption that per capita cash withdrawal
demand does not depend on the number of consumers.
5 Empirical results
The empirical model consists of the ATM demand or usage equation (11) and the investment
or entry equation (16)-(17), as also summarized by (19). To estimate this model we observe
QA and N , and a set of market characteristics for a cross-section of 659 markets, as discussed
earlier in Section 2 and Tables 1 and 2. The market characteristics enter the demand equation
(11) through X, and the entry equation (16)-(17) through W . Intuitively, X and W contain
the market-level determinants of respectively total per capita cash withdrawals lnQ, and the
ratio of xed costs over variable cost savings lnF=(cB   cA). We will set X = W , hence we
allow lnQ and lnF=(cB   cA) to be a¤ected by the same determinants. A rst specication
includes an intercept only, so that lnQ and lnF= (cB   cA) are assumed to be uniform across
markets. A second specication allows Q and F= (cB   cA) to vary according to the following
market demographics: the number of enterprises, the percentage of foreigners, young, elderly
and unemployed, and a region dummy for Flanders.
Demand model only We rst present the results from estimating the demand equation
(11) only. This equation contains the ATM cash withdrawal share function sA(N), as given
by (9), which is nonlinear in the parameters vB vA and . We therefore estimate the demand
equation by maximum likelihood, but this does not take into account that QA and N are
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simultaneously determined. The results from the demand equation thus serve to highlight
the endogeneity and selection issues associated with the number of ATMs N .
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates. The parameter  is estimated to be highly signif-
icant in both the specication without and with market characteristics inuencing Q. Recall
that  measures how ATM usage is a¤ected by the implicit price of an ATM withdrawal pA.
Since this implicit price is inversely proportional to
p
N , the signicant estimate of  means
that consumers withdraw signicantly more cash at ATMs than at branches in markets where
N is high. The parameter estimate of  allows us to compute the demand elasticity with





.24 This elasticity estimate (evaluated at
the sample mean) is quite high, i.e. 1.09 and 0.89 in the two respective specications. This
may however not describe the causal e¤ect of N on QA, but only a correlation since banks
may have an incentive to invest in many ATMs when they observe a high ATM demand
shock, and vice versa. The simultaneous model of ATM demand and investment will take
this into account.
The second specication in Table 5 shows how market demographics a¤ect the total num-
ber of per capita cash withdrawals Q (at ATMs and branches). Cash withdrawals tend to be
signicantly higher in markets with many elderly, which may indicate that this demographic
group does not make use of electronic payments to the same extent. Cash withdrawal demand
is signicantly lower in the region of Flanders, and the other demographics do not play a
statistically signicant role. The implied value of Q (at sample means) is precisely estimated
at 1.28 in the rst and 1.21 in the second specication.25 Note that this is signicantly lower
than the estimate of 2:07 cash withdrawals per capita and per month, available from our
external sources.
Simultaneous demand and investment model Table 6 displays the maximum likeli-
hood estimates from the full simultaneous equations model (19), consisting of the demand or
usage equation (11) and the investment equation (16)-(17). As discussed earlier, the model
allows for correlation between the unobserved shocks a¤ecting both demand and investment,
thereby accounting for endogeneity and selection issues associated with N . We rst veried
that demand is concave at the estimated parameters in all markets. Hence, the inequalities
(16)-(17) are both necessary and su¢ cient for optimal investment.
First, consider the demand parameters (, vB   vA and ). Several parameters di¤er
substantially from the estimates of the single equation model. Most notably, for both the
specication without and with market characteristics, the estimate of  is almost three











25Using (10), this is simply computed as Q = exp(X), evaluated at the sample means for X.
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times smaller (and it is also more precise). This translates into lower elasticities of ATM
cash demand with respect to the number of ATMs, i.e. estimates (at sample means) of
0:65 in both specications. Intuitively, the elasticity estimates of 1:09 and 0:89 in the single
equation demand model only capture the correlation between N and QA, which may be high
if unobserved demand shocks induce banks to invest in many ATMs. The lower elasticity
estimates of the simultaneous equation model capture the causal e¤ect of N on QA, which
is what we are interested in when making welfare comparisons.
To further appreciate how the simultaneous equations model corrects for the endogeneity
of N , consider the estimated correlation between the structural demand and cost errors 1
and 2, as computed from 1, 2 and 12.
26 These are relatively low in both specications
(respectively,  0:14 and  0:06) and insignicant in the second specication. However, they
translate into highly signicant negative correlations between our econometric errors "1 = 1
and "2 = 2   1, of respectively  0:73 and  0:69. Intuitively, the demand error 1 enters
both the demand and the investment equation, so banks take into account that a high
ATM demand shock 1 also implies high marginal prots from investing in ATMs. Hence,
both demand QA and N will tend to be high, which is properly accounted for through the
covariance parameter 12. The single demand equation ignored this covariance, resulting in
an overestimation of .
The parameter vB   vA is positive and signicant in both specications: other things
equal, consumers prefer a cash transaction at a branch over one at an ATM. This is as
expected since consumers can combine a branch visit with several other services that are
not necessarily available at shared ATMs. Finally, the second specication in Table 6 again
shows that the total number of cash withdrawals Q is especially high among elderly and
outside Flanders. The implied estimate of Q (at sample means) is now equal to 1:71 and
1:93 in the two respective specications. While these numbers are still somewhat lower than
the estimate of 2:07 from our external sources, the underestimation is no longer statistically
signicant in contrast with the single equation demand estimates.
Second, consider the investment (or entry) parameters (), as shown in the second part of
Table 6. The rst specication without demographics includes a highly signicant intercept
0 = 8:26, which translates in a precise estimate of the ratio of the xed cost over variable cost
savings, i.e. F=(cB cA) = exp(0) = 3; 876, with a 95% condence interval of [3; 556; 4; 197].
The second specication with demographics implies a very similar ratio of 3; 932 (at sample
26Given the mean-zero bivariate normal distribution of "1 and "2, the structural errors 1 = "1 and






2 + 212, and a









means). To assess whether this ratio is reasonable, we can use xed and variable cost
information from our external sources, discussed earlier in Section 2.1. According to the
network operator Banksys the monthly xed costs of an ATM are e2; 300. Our estimated
ratio F=(cB cA) then implies that the variable cost savings from cash withdrawals at ATMs
instead of branches amount to e0:59 and e0:58 in the two respective specications. This
is of a similar order of magnitude as Kimball and Gregors (1995) estimated variable cost
savings of $0:80.
To evaluate the t of the full simultaneous equations model, we compare the models
predicted number of ATMs with the observed number in each market. To predict N , we
take a large number of draws of "1 and "2 for each market (100 draws). For each market
and each draw, we compute the joint prot maximizing N based on the parameter estimates
and equilibrium condition (17). For each market, we then compute the average of N over
all draws, and take this as the predicted N for the given market. Similar to Berry and
Waldfogel (1999), we then compute the correlation between the predicted and the observed
number of ATMs for the markets. This is equal to 0.78 and 0.81 in the models without and
with demographics, implying an R2 of, respectively 0.60 and 0.65.
Sensitivity analysis Our discussion focused on two specications, based on the sample
of 659 non-urban markets. We also estimated the model using the complete sample of 842
markets, i.e. including the urban areas. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix show that
most of the parameter estimates are similar, and they do not generate di¤erent qualita-
tive conclusions. We have also considered a sensitivity analysis regarding some specication
assumptions, which will be discussed in Section 7.
6 Policy counterfactuals
We use our parameter estimates to compare the status quo situation of coordinated entry and
zero retail fees with several alternative scenarios with positive retail fees and/or subsidies per
ATM. We ask how these alternative scenarios inuence ATM investment (a highly sensitive
political issue because of a perceived lack of geographic coverage), ATM demand or usage,
and total welfare.
6.1 Approach
We compute the predicted number of ATMs, the number markets without an ATM and the
various welfare components (consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenues)
23
under various scenarios. The rst one is simply the status quo scenario, in which banks
coordinate ATM investment, charge zero retail cash withdrawal fees at branches and ATMs
and obtain no subsidies per ATM. The second scenario is the social optimum or rst-best
solution. As discussed in Section 3, the rst-best can be obtained in two ways: in a centralized
way by maximizing total welfare (6) with respect to the number of ATMs N and cash
withdrawal fees tA and tB; or in a decentralized way through welfare-maximizing retail fees
and subsidies while allowing banks to coordinate on N given these fees and subsidies. The
third and fourth scenarios are the second-best fees-only and subsidies-only scenarios,
where the social planner optimally chooses either fees or subsidies but not both, and banks
subsequently coordinate on N .
The status quo predictions follow the approach used for computing the models t as
described in the previous section. The predictions of the other three scenarios are similar
but slightly more involved. To illustrate, we explain the approach of the third scenario, where
the social planner optimally sets the retail cash withdrawal fees, but maintains zero subsidies.
For each market we take a large number of draws of "1 and "2 (i.e. 100 draws).27 For each
market and each draw we take a possible fee structure (tA; tB), we compute the joint prot
maximizing number of ATMs n( tA; tB; 0), based on the equilibrium condition (17), and
compute total welfare W (n( tA; tB; 0); tA; tB; 0). We then search over alternative (tA; tB)
to nd the fees that maximize total welfare. We repeat this approach for each market and
each draw to obtain optimal fees and the implied welfare components for each market and
each draw. We subsequently compute summary information across markets on the optimal
retail fees and/or subsidies, on ATM investment and usage, and welfare. We present both
the means and the standard errors from our 100 draws.
This approach assumes that the social planner can set optimal fees specic to each market.
In reality, it would be more reasonable to assume that a regulator sets a uniform fee for
all markets. We also followed that approach and obtained very similar results. However,
we prefer to present the results from the optimal market-specic fees since this provides a
sharper economic intuition and a clear-cut benchmark for rst-best.
Since our empirical model assumes that total cash withdrawal demand Q is inelastic,
optimal welfare only depends on the di¤erence tB   tA and not on the levels of tA and
tB separately. This facilitates the exposition and especially the calculations as it is only
necessary to search over the di¤erence tB   tA.28
27We take these draws from the normal distribution. This di¤ers from Berry and Waldfogel (1999), who
take draws from a truncated normal distribution such that the status quo is perfectly predicted. We also
followed their approach and obtained similar results.
28Concretely, in our third scenario with optimal fees and no subsidies we search over 201 possible values
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To perform our counterfactuals we need some identication assumptions. The empirical
model only identied the ratio F= (cB   cA). Based on our external estimate, we assume
that F =e2,300, implying that cB cA =e0.59. The results were similar for higher values of
xed costs with correspondingly higher variable cost savings. The empirical model does also
not identify the travel cost per unit of distance k (in e/km) from the price parameter . In
our welfare analysis, a high assumed value of k implies a high weight to consumer surplus
relative to producer surplus. We therefore use two alternative values k =e0.1 and k =e0.25.
The higher value is a commonly used by companies and tax authorities to reimburse travel
costs. The lower value roughly corresponds to Gowrisankaran and Krainers (2007) estimate
of ATM travel costs (using a di¤erent model and data). We focus our discussion on the
results for k=e0.25, and present the results for k=e0.1 as a robustness check in Table A3
of the Appendix.
6.2 Results
Status quo The rst column of Table 7 shows the 1994 status quo predictions, when
fees and subsidies are zero. The predicted total number of ATMs across all markets is 490
(standard error of 19), which is close to the actually observed number of ATMs of 486. The
predicted number of markets without an ATM is 330, again not signicantly di¤erent from
the actual number of unserved markets of 349. Hence, under the status quo over one half of
the non-urban markets are unserved by shared ATMs.
The low density of the ATM network is reected in a low number of per capita ATM
cash withdrawals under the status quo. The model predicts monthly per capita ATM cash
withdrawals of 0.59, which is close to and not signicantly di¤erent from the observed number
of 0.56. This is only one third of total cash withdrawals at ATMs and branches, hence ATM
usage is rather low.
First-best The second column of Table 7 shows the rst-best predictions. As discussed,
these can be obtained either in a centralized way by choosing N and tB   tA, or in a
decentralized way by setting S and tB   tA, and subsequently allowing banks to continue to
coordinate on N . Table 7 shows that a regulator would like to invest in a much larger shared
ATM network: the total number of ATMs across markets under the social optimum is 1018
tB   tA in the interval ( 5; 5) for each market and each draw. Since there are 659 markets and 100 draws
per market, the equilibrium number of ATMs n( tA; tB ; 0) has to be computed over 13 million times. In
the rst-best scenario, for each market and each draw we in addition consider 53 possible subsidy values S
in the interval (0; 2600) for each price di¤erence tB   tA. This amounts to about 702 million computations
of the socially optimal number of ATMs n( tA; tB ; S).
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(standard error of 20), which is more than twice as much as the status quo number of 490.
The number of unserved markets is almost three times lower, dropping from 330 under the
status quo to 114 under the social optimum. Finally, ATM usage is substantially larger in
the social optimum: the number of cash withdrawals at ATMs increases from a monthly per
capita average of 0.59 to 1.42, amounting to more than two thirds of total cash transactions
(at ATMs and branches).
One may therefore conclude that ATM investment and usage have been considerably
lower than socially optimal. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the undervestment
is due to the fact that the coordinating banks do not take into account the e¤ects of their
investments on consumer surplus. The suboptimal ATM usage may be either due to the too
low ATM network size or due to the regulatory context with zero fees for cash withdrawals.
It is therefore of interest to look at the subsidies and retail fees that implement the social
optimum. Table 7 shows that the optimal extra retail fee for cash withdrawals at branches
tB   tA is on average e0.62, which is essentially cost-based (close to the extra variable costs
at branches of cB   cA =e0.59). The accompanying optimal ATM subsidy S is e2,236,
which is also essentially cost-based (close to the xed costs of an ATM of e2,300).29
Total welfare for our sample of non-urban areas in Belgium increases by e2.16 million per
month. Banks capture the largest share of the welfare gains: they would receive an additional
e6.4 million per month, because of the subsidies, the fee revenues from cash withdrawals
at branches and the variable cost savings from consumers substituting to ATMs. The gov-
ernment loses e2.27 million per month, due to the subsidies paid to the banks. Perhaps
surprisingly, consumers lose e1.97 million per month despite the much more dense shared
ATM network. Their benets in the form of reduced travel costs to ATMs are overwhelmed
by the losses from the fees they have to pay for branch withdrawals.
Second-best How close can one reach to the rst-best through either subsidies-only
or fees-only? Consider rst the subsidies-only case, shown on the third column of Table
7. This should be interpreted as a policy to directly promote ATM investment, so other
instruments such as tax deductions may achieve the same outcome. The optimal subsidy
per ATM is on average e1,545, which is about two thirds of the xed cost of an ATM. This
results in a substantial increase in the number of ATMs, from 490 to 1022, very close to the
socially optimal number. Similarly, there is a considerable drop in the number of markets
29WhenN is a continuous variable, it can easily be shown that the social optimum requires tB tA = cB cA
and S = F . This is not necessarily true when N can only take integer values as in our set-up, but the
simulation results are nevertheless close. This tendency to cost-based optimal fees and subsidies also explains
why the standard errors of the predicted fees an subsidies are so low.
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without an ATM, from 330 to 148 markets, which is again close to geographic coverage in the
social optimum. However, the monthly number of cash withdrawals at ATMs increases only
moderately from 0.59 to 0.84, which is still far below the social optimum of 1.42. As a result,
the total welfare gains amount to only e0.59 million per month, far less than the maximum
attainable welfare gains of e2.16 million per month under the rst-best. Intuitively, this is
because the pure promotion of ATM investment is a rather expensive way to promote usage
of the cost-saving technology. Note nally that consumers gain e1.03 million per month
(in contrast with the consumer losses in rst-best): they save on travel costs because of the
more dense ATM network, and they do not have to pay retail fees.
Now consider the fees-only case, shown on the nal column of Table 7. The optimal extra
retail fee for cash withdrawals at branches is on average e0.47 per transaction, slightly below
the extra variable cost of about e0.60 for cash withdrawals at branches. The extra retail
fee has only minor e¤ects on the banks investment decisions, hence geographic coverage
remains suboptimal. This is because the retail fees make it relatively more protable to
serve customers at branches, thus reducing the variable cost saving incentive from adopting
ATMs. However, the fees induce consumers to substitute out of branches and use ATMs
more often: the number of cash withdrawals at ATMs increases from 0.59 to 0.88 per capita
and per month. These changes result in a monthly increase of total welfare by e1.12 million,
largely because of prot increases at the expense of consumers. Interestingly, a policy of
raising retail fees without subsidies is thus more e¤ective in improving welfare than a policy
of introducing subsidies while keeping fees at zero, despite the fact that the latter policy
brings ATM investment closely in line with the rst-best. This is because a fees-only policy
also induces consumers to substitute to ATM withdrawals, hence realizing variable cost
savings without the need of extra xed cost investments in ATMs.
Note that a fees-only policy is even more e¤ective than a subsidies-only policy if we
assume a lower cost per km, k=e0.10, as shown in Table A3 of the Appendix. Intuitively,
under a lower k consumers receive less weight in total welfare, so that fees become an even
more e¤ective instrument to improve welfare.
Summary The policy counterfactuals show that there is substantial underinvestment in
the shared ATM network, implying a too large number of unserved markets. Furthermore,
ATM demand or usage is too low; consumers use branches too often to withdraw cash. A
policy that combines cost-based cash withdrawal fees and ATM subsidies can achieve the so-
cial optimum and raise welfare to a signicant extent. A second-best fees-only policy is more
e¤ective in raising welfare than the direct promotion of investment through a subsidies-only
policy, since it induces consumers to substitute to ATM withdrawals without requiring ex-
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pensive extra investments in ATMs. However, if geographic coverage is a policy objective per
se (because of distributional considerations), a subsidies-only policy may still be preferable
to a fees-only policy.
7 Extensions
To assess the robustness of our results, we extended our model in two ways. First, we
considered an alternative functional form for our logit ATM market share specication (8).
Second, we introduced the possibility of economies of density by allowing the xed costs per
ATM to depend on the number of ATMs in the market.
7.1 Alternative demand specication
Our logit ATM market share specication (8) contained the parameter vB  vA, the intrinsic
utility from withdrawing cash at branches instead of ATMs. As explained in Section 4.1, vB 
vA is not well identied from , the parameter vector entering total cash withdrawal demand
Q. The reason is that we only observed ATM demand QA and not total cash withdrawal
demand Q. Our approach to this identication problem was to identify the vB   vA from
 through the non-linearity of the market share specication (8), and subsequently assess
whether Q as predicted from (10) was close to our country-level estimate of Q from an
external source. The estimates of our simultaneous demand and investment model showed
that this was indeed the case.
To shed further light on the identication issue, we now consider an alternative ATM
market share specication. As an alternative to (7), let indirect utility or consumer surplus
of a depositor a¢ liated to bank i take the following form:




vB   piB + exp
 





Applying Roys identity to (20), a bank i consumers share of ATM cash withdrawals in total
cash withdrawals is
siA (pA) = exp
 





We refer to this as our semilog specication. Substituting (21) in (9) and (11), we obtain
the following specication for ATM transaction demand










This shows that vB   vA now enters linearly, so that it is clearly not identied from the
intercept 0 in , not even through the functional form. After estimating the model, we
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therefore set vB  vA and 0 such that the predicted Q is equal to 2.07 for the representative
market.
The empirical results for the full simultaneous demand and investment model are shown
in Table 8. The rst column repeats the earlier results for the logit specication, and the
second column shows the results for the semilog specication. A comparison shows that the
results are very similar; the same is evidently true for the policy counterfactuals (not shown).
7.2 Economies of density
Our investment specication assumed a xed cost F per ATM, independent of the number of
ATMs in the market. In practice, it is possible that there are economies of density in setting
up an ATM network. For example, the network operators xed maintenance costs may be
lower when there are many nearby ATMs in the same market. Holmes (2007) provides a
thorough analysis of economies of density based Walmarts location decisions. To account
for economies of density we extend our specication of the ratio of xed cost over variable




= W +  lnN + 2:
If  < 0, there are economies of density since an increase in N lowers the xed cost F per
ATM (assuming that cB   cA is independent of N).
The empirical results are shown in the third column of Table 8. We indeed nd evidence
of economies of density, since  =  0:36 (standard error of 0:10). Most other parameter
estimates are close to those in the rst column, where  = 0. Since the ratio of xed cost
over variable cost savings is no longer constant, we present the ratio for markets with N = 1
and N = 2 (covering 90% of the markets with an ATM). The ratio is equal to 4; 176 when
N = 1 and 3; 264 when N = 2, compared with our earlier constant estimate of 3; 932. We
also considered policy counterfactuals, continuing to assume a constant subsidy S per ATM.
Because of the economies of density, the optimal subsidy per ATM was on average lower than
in our baseline case without economies of density, but most other results remained similar.
8 Conclusion
We have analyzed investment and usage in a shared ATM network. Because ATMs are
compatible and there are no retail fees, banks have no strategic or revenue motives but only
a pure cost-saving incentive for investing in ATMs. Furthermore, because retail fees for
cash withdrawals are regulated to zero, consumers may have insu¢ cient incentives to use
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the available cost-saving ATMs. We developed an empirical model of coordinated invest-
ment and ATM cash withdrawal demand, and applied it to the Belgian market in the early
nineties. Our results showed that banks substantially underinvested in the shared ATM
network because they cannot appropriate all consumer surplus. This contrasts with earlier
ndings of overinvestment in ATM networks with partial incompatibility due to surcharges.
Furthermore, we found that usage of the ATM network is too low because of the zero retail
fees for cash withdrawals at branches. A direct promotion of investment (through subsidies
or other means) can improve e¢ ciency, but the introduction of proper retail fees on cash
withdrawals at branches would be more e¤ective in raising welfare, even if it does not en-
courage investment per se. Our results stress the importance of both the correct investment
incentives to rms and price incentives to consumers.
Our analysis is based on the institutional context of Belgium, with a fully shared network,
coordinated investment, and no retail fees for cash withdrawals at branches or ATMs. Our
analysis is however also relevant for understanding the situation in many U.S. states before
the introduction of surcharges in the mid-nineties. Combining our results with the recent U.S.
ndings, one may conclude that there has been a shift from a substantial underinvestment
to an overinvestment due to the introduction of surcharges. Our analysis is also relevant for
the current or recent situation in many other European countries, including larger countries
such as France and Italy and smaller countries such as Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden
or Switzerland. As discussed, these countries have in common the presence of a single
or dominant shared network. However, some of these countries may still di¤er in specic
institutional details, e.g. the level of (non-discriminatory) fees or the extent of coordination
of the investment decisions. It would therefore be interesting in future work to apply or extend
our framework to learn whether our results of underinvestment in compatible networks can
be generalized. More generally, we hope our work will stimulate further research that jointly
considers investment and usage of new technologies.
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Table 1: Variable description (referring to the sample of markets)
ATM withdrawals (QA) monthly per capita number of cash withdrawals at shared ATMs
withdrawal value (VA=QA) value per cash withdrawal at shared ATMs
number of ATMs (N) number of shared ATMs
number of branches per bank number of branches per bank
population (L) population
surface (M) surface (in km2)
enterprises number of enterprises
foreign fraction of foreigners in the population
young fraction of population under 18
elderly fraction of population over 65
unemployment rate unemployment rate
Flanders indicator variable for Dutch-speaking part of Belgium
Table 2: Summary statistics
all markets markets with at
least one ATM
mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
ATM withdrawals (QA) 0:56 0:47 0:78 0:37
withdrawal value (VA=QA) 73:21 45:67 101:15 7:14
number of ATMs (N) 0:74 0:97 1:57 0:84
number of branches per bank 0:86 0:64 1:25 0:65
population (L) 8738 7314 13445 7884
surface (M) 36:78 29:25 45:41 32:55
enterprises 1329 2366 1466 2104
foreign 0:04 0:06 0:05 0:06
young 0:22 0:02 0:21 0:02
elderly 0:16 0:02 0:16 0:02
unemployment rate 0:03 0:02 0:03 0:02
Flanders 0:58 0:49 0:63 0:48
number of observations 659 310
Notes: For a description of the variables, see Table 1. The means for QA
and VA =QA are population-weighted. Sources: Banksys, N.I.S., B.V.B.
and R.S.Z..
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Table 3: ATM cash withdrawal demand and number of ATMs
number of ATM withdrawals withdrawal value
observations mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
N=0 349 0 0 0 0
N=1 185 0:63 0:31 102:22 7:38
N=2 90 0:83 0:37 101:27 6:97
N=3 23 0:96 0:41 100:35 6:67
N=4 9 1:01 0:32 97:08 6:47
N=5 2 1:13 0:35 97:65 2:68
N=6 1 0:74 92:73
total 659 0:56 0:47 73:21 45:67
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables,
see Tables 1 and 2. The means for ATM withdrawals and with-
drawal value are population-weighted. Source: Banksys.
Table 4: Reduced-form demand regressions
param. st. err. param. st. err.
ATM withdrawals withdrawal value
(log) number of ATMs (lnN) 0:63 (0:07)  0:03 (0:01)
(log) number of branches per bank  0:51 (0:07) 0:02 (0:01)
constant  0:97 (0:69) 4:73 (0:08)
enterprises  0:44 (1:32)  0:08 (0:14)
foreign  0:57 (0:51) 0:09 (0:06)
young  0:29 (2:10)  0:50 (0:23)
elderly 4:84 (1:50) 0:03 (0:17)
unemployment rate  2:63 (2:56)  1:44 (0:28)
Flanders  0:14 (0:11) 0:05 (0:01)
R2 0:37 0:56
number of observations 310 310
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables, see Tables 1
and 2. Dependent variables are log of ATM withdrawals (lnQA) respectively log
of per transaction withdrawal value (ln(VA=QA)). Enterprises is the number of
enterprises in the market, divided by 100000.
35
Table 5: Parameter estimates and predictions from demand model only
param. st. err. param. st. err.
demand equation (11)
 6:18 (1:05) 5:47 (1:19)
vB   vA  0:59 (0:38)  0:75 (0:48)





unemployment rate  3:70 (2:26)
Flanders  0:33 (0:08)
1 0:39 (0:01) 0:36 (0:01)
implied demand predictions
total cash withdrawals (Q) 1:28 (0:15) 1:21 (0:17)
share of ATM cash withdrawal (sA(N)) 0:56 (0:07) 0:60 (0:09)
elasticity (EA) 1:09 (0:09) 0:89 (0:09)
number of observations 310 310
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables, see Tables 1 and 2.
Enterprises is the number of enterprises in the market, divided by 100000. Implied
demand predictions are at sample means.
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Table 6: Parameter estimates and predictions from simultaneous demand and entry model
param. st. err. param. st. err.
demand equation (11)
 2:30 (0:22) 2:18 (0:22)
vB   vA 0:51 (0:25) 0:65 (0:27)





unemployment rate  0:23 (2:32)
Flanders  0:21 (0:09)
1 0:44 (0:02) 0:40 (0:02)
implied demand predictions
cash withdrawals (Q) 1:71 (0:28) 1:93 (0:35)
share of ATM cash withdrawal (sA(N)) 0:35 (0:05) 0:32 (0:06)
elasticity (EA) 0:65 (0:02) 0:65 (0:03)
investment equation (16)(17)





unemployment rate  4:68 (2:50)
Flanders  0:23 (0:10)
2 0:70 (0:03) 0:61 (0:03)
12  0:22 (0:03)  0:17 (0:02)
implied cost predictions
F=(cB   cA) 3876 (164) 3932 (158)
R2 0:60 0:65
number of observations 659 659
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables, see Tables 1 and 2.
Enterprises is the number of enterprises in the market, divided by 100000. Implied
demand and cost predictions are at sample means.
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Table 7: Policy counterfactuals
status quo rst-best subsidy only fees only
optimal subsidies and fees
average subsidy per ATM S 0 2236 1545 0
(2:60) (13:05)
average fee tB   tA 0 0:62 0 0:47
(0:01) (0:01)
ATM investment and demand
total number of ATMs 490 1018 1022 463
(18:59) (20:41) (22:20) (14:84)
total number of markets without ATM 330 114 148 312
(10:18) (7:08) (7:67) (10:51)
average share of ATM cash withdrawals 0:25 0:66 0:38 0:39
(0:01) (0:01) (0:00) (0:01)
average number of ATM cash withdrawals 0:59 1:42 0:84 0:89
(0:03) (0:04) (0:03) (0:04)
welfare (in millions of euro)
change in producer surplus 0 6:40 1:14 4:06
(0:20) (0:02) (0:17)
change in consumer surplus 0  1:97 1:03  2:94
(0:08) (0:04) (0:10)
change in government revenues 0  2:27  1:58 0
(0:05) (0:03)
change in total welfare 0 2:16 0:59 1:12
(0:10) (0:03) (0:08)
Notes: Number of observations is 659 markets. 100 simulations draws per market. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Cost per unit of distance k=e0.25, ATM xed costs F=e2300, as discussed in
the text.
38
Table 8: Parameter estimates and predictions from simultaneous demand and entry model:
extensions
param. st. err. param. st. err. param. st. err.
base model semilog ec. of density
demand equation (11)
 2:18 (0:22) 1:33 (0:06) 1:94 (0:22)
vB   vA 0:65 (0:27) 1:17  0:18 (0:42)
constant 0:28 (0:56) 0:31 (0:55)  0:08 (0:57)
enterprises  1:43 (0:85)  1:64 (0:83)  1:69 (0:88)
foreign  0:11 (0:29)  0:17 (0:29)  0:07 (0:30)
young  0:75 (1:68)  0:71 (1:70)  1:57 (1:74)
elderly 4:31 (1:19) 4:46 (1:19) 4:57 (1:23)
unemployment rate  0:23 (2:32) 0:19 (2:33) 0:85 (2:34)
Flanders  0:21 (0:09)  0:21 (0:09)  0:23 (0:09)
1 0:40 (0:02) 0:41 (0:02) 0:41 (0:02)
implied demand predictions
cash withdrawals (Q) 1:93 (0:35) 2:08 (0:07) 1:21 (0:25)
share of ATM cash withdrawal (sA) 0:32 (0:06) 0:29 (0:00) 0:52 (0:10)
elasticity (EA) 0:65 (0:03) 0:59 (0:03) 0:41 (0:07)
investment equation (16)(17)
constant 9:22 (0:69) 9:20 (0:66) 9:56 (0:64)
enterprises  0:23 (0:96)  0:46 (0:91)  0:46 (0:90)
foreign  1:85 (0:49)  2:03 (0:47)  1:68 (0:47)
young 1:14 (2:08) 1:04 (1:99)  0:72 (1:97)
elderly  5:13 (1:60)  4:80 (1:53)  5:07 (1:46)
unemployment rate  4:68 (2:50)  4:21 (2:41)  2:38 2:42)
Flanders  0:23 (0:10)  0:26 (0:10)  0:15 (0:09)
economies of density () 0 0  0:36 (0:10)
2 0:61 (0:03) 0:61 (0:03) 0:59 (0:03)
12  0:17 (0:02)  0:18 (0:02)  0:18 (0:02)
implied cost predictions
F=(cB   cA) for N = 1 3932 (158) 3894 (164) 4176 (157)
F=(cB   cA) for N = 2 3932 (158) 3894 (164) 3264 (123)
R2 0:65 0:64 0:65
number of observations 659 659 659
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables, see Tables 1 and 2. Enterprises is
the number of enterprises in the market, divided by 100000. Implied demand and cost predictions
are at sample means.
Appendix: Sensitivity analysis
Table A1: Parameter estimates and predictions from demand model only: full
sample of markets
param. st. err. param. st. err.
demand equation (11)
a 6:36 (0:99) 5:50 (1:11)
vB   vA  0:30 (0:33)  0:48 (0:44)





unemployment rate  3:85 (1:72)
Flanders  0:38 (0:07)
1 0:44 (0:01) 0:42 (0:01)
implied demand predictions
cash withdrawals (Q) 1:47 (0:18) 1:35 (0:20)
share of ATM cash withdrawal (sA) 0:62 (0:07) 0:66 (0:10)
elasticity (EA) 0:73 (0:07) 0:58 (0:07)
number of observations 467 467
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables, see Tables
1 and 2. Enterprises is the number of enterprises in the market, divided by
100000. Implied demand predictions are at sample means.
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Table A2: Parameter estimates and predictions from simultaneous demand and
entry model: full sample of markets
param. st. err. param. st. err.
demand equation (11)
 2:99 (0:27) 2:70 (0:24)
vB   vA  0:08 (0:20) 0:15 (0:21)





unemployment rate  1:43 (1:87)
Flanders  0:30 (0:08)
1 0:51 (0:01) 0:47 (0:01)
implied demand predictions
cash withdrawals (Q) 1:28 (0:13) 1:45 (0:17)
share of ATM cash withdrawal (sA) 0:55 (0:05) 0:49 (0:05)
elasticity (EA) 0:43 (0:01) 0:44 (0:01)
investment equation (16)(17)





unemployment rate  5:54 (1:91)
Flanders  0:24 (0:09)
2 0:99 (0:04) 0:80 (0:03)
12  0:39 (0:03)  0:28 (0:03)
implied cost predictions
F=(cB   cA) 3284 (134) 3337 (126)
R2 0:56 0:62
number of observations 842 842
Notes: For a description and summary statistics of the variables, see Tables
1 and 2. Enterprises is the number of enterprises in the market, divided by
100000. Implied demand and cost predictions are at sample means.
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Table A3: Policy counterfactuals (alternative cost per unit of distance)
status quo rst best subsidy only fees only
optimal subsidies and fees
average subsidy per ATM S 0 2243 1208 0
(1:18) (17:39)
average fee tB   tA 0 0:62 0 0:53
(0:01) (0:01)
ATM investment and demand
total number of ATMs 490 700 711 409
(18:59) (13:47) (20:77) (11:81)
total number of markets without ATM 330 131 234 284
(10:18) (8:21) (10:09) (10:15)
average share of ATM cash withdrawals 0:25 0:83 0:32 0:62
(0:01) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
average number of ATM cash withdrawals 0:59 1:75 0:72 1:36
(0:03) (0:05) (0:03) (0:05)
welfare (in millions of euro)
change in producer surplus 0 6:54 0:76 5:29
(0:20) (0:02) (0:19)
change in consumer surplus 0  1:96 0:21  2:74
(0:05) (0:01) (0:07)
change in government revenues 0  1:57  0:86 0
(0:03) (0:02)
change in total welfare 0 3:02 0:11 2:55
(0:15) (0:01) (0:14)
Notes: Number of observations is 842 markets. 100 simulations draws per market. Standard errors












































































Figure 1: Evolution of the shared ATM network in Belgium (1979-2004)
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